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—1944

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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated  
22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIII, No. 18

FEBRUARY 18, 1944

## RUSSIA'S DRIVE FOR VICTORY SHARPENS CONFLICT WITH VATICAN

THE assertion of *Izvestia* on February 1 that the foreign policy of the Vatican has disillusioned Catholics throughout the world and "earned the hatred and contempt of the Italian masses for supporting Fascism" has, understandably, aroused widespread discussion in this country. The *Izvestia* article linked its allegations to a report, "Foreign Policy of the Vatican," published on January 15 by the Foreign Policy Association. Since it is unlikely that copies of this report had reached Moscow by February 1, it must be assumed that the *Izvestia* article was based on newspaper dispatches concerning the report which gave wide publicity to its contents both in this country and abroad. As several leading Catholic organs, notably *America* and the National Catholic Welfare Conference, have pointed out, some of the news stories did not give an entirely rounded version of the FPA report. One of the main conclusions of the report, in direct contradiction to the *Izvestia* article, reads as follows: "The view that the Pope is at heart a Fascist and wishes to see the triumph of modern dictatorships, while a long sequence of superficial evidence can be constructed to support it, proves to be without foundation in fact. At the same time, he is not a supporter of democracy but is just what he claims to be—indifferent to political forms, accepting any government which will meet the minimum demands of the church."

**POLITICAL ISSUES AT STAKE.** No organization that undertakes to discuss a subject so controversial and so charged with varied emotions as the foreign policy of the Vatican can possibly expect to escape criticism from all sides. What to one person may appear unfair aspersions may seem to another an attempt at whitewashing. In fact, one of the most disturbing aspects of our times is the apparent impossibility for large sections of people to listen with any degree of reasonableness to views with which they do not happen to agree. Amid the welter

of arguments and counterarguments aroused by discussion of the Vatican's foreign policy, three points should be borne in mind:

1. Any questions that are raised by responsible students of international affairs regarding the position of the Vatican concern not the spiritual leadership of the Pope or the content of Catholic beliefs, but the political influence which the Pope unquestionably exercises as spiritual leader of millions of Catholics. If other religious organizations—the Church of England, or the Methodists, or the Greek Orthodox Church—had a Secretariat of State like the Vatican, and maintained representatives of diplomatic rank in foreign capitals, their views and pronouncements would be similarly open to public discussion.

2. The Soviet government's recurring attacks on the Vatican—that, in the form in which they are often couched, cannot but hurt the sensitivity of many religious people, whatever their faith—are due first and foremost to Moscow's opposition to the political influence of the Vatican. This influence, the Soviet leaders feel—and with justification—has often been used against the U.S.S.R. during the past quarter of a century. The fact that Russia is now at odds with Poland, a predominantly Catholic country, has recently envenomed this long-standing conflict, and at least in part explains the fierceness of the broadside delivered by *Izvestia*.

3. The Vatican's hostility toward the Soviet government, of which there is also no doubt, has been due first and foremost to the treatment meted out by Soviet authorities to religious organizations, and to the ruthless attacks directed before 1941 by such Soviet organizations as *The Godless* against all outward manifestations of religious sentiment. Fear that what happened in Russia after 1917 might be repeated in other countries where poli-

tical groups influenced by Soviet doctrines were active unquestionably had a profound influence on the policy of the Vatican toward Mussolini, Hitler and, especially, Franco.

**U.S.S.R. DETERMINED TO WIN NOW.** What has now crystallized all these long-run trends is the determination of the Soviet government to bring the war with Germany to an end this year, if at all possible. While the United States, and in lesser measure Britain, might conceivably afford to go on fighting for an indeterminate period, since their productive capacities have not been destroyed by the enemy, that is not true of the U.S.S.R. and—what may prove most important for the future of Europe—it is even less true of the conquered countries. The unremitting way in which the Soviet government has been lashing out since the Teheran conference at all of Hitler's voluntary or involuntary satellites—Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland—indicates its determination to shatter Germany's political front as the Russian armies are shattering German military resistance. To the extent that the Vatican, in its opposition to the anti-clericalism of the Loyalists, has displayed sympathy for Franco, it too has become an object of Russian attack. The militant "we or they" tone of the Soviet press reflects the heightened tension of a country which for nearly three grueling years has been engaged in a life and death struggle, and does not intend to let anyone or anything stand in the way of its termination.

In the heat of verbal battle, Soviet spokesmen have made statements about the Vatican that are historically unconvincing. *Izvestia* denounces the Vatican for maintaining relations with the Hitler and Mussolini governments—but before 1939 all the great powers maintained relations, including Russia which, far from breaking off with the Reich at the start of

## EQUATORIAL AFRICA SETS NEW

The French Colonial Conference held at Brazzaville in French Equatorial Africa during the first week of February, at which General de Gaulle delivered the opening address, resulted in the announcement of three alternative plans for the development of France's colonial affairs. In one sense the deliberations at Brazzaville represent but another step in the process of coordinating French affairs already underway in Algiers. Certain other developments within the Empire previous to the conference—notably the achievements of Felix Eboué in French Equatorial Africa and the proposal for colonial "federation" announced last December in connection with Indo-China—suggest that modifications are being made in French colonial policy.

**FUTURE COLONIAL POLICY.** The three alternative suggestions emanating from the conference were: (1) an enlarged colonial representation in the

World War II, concluded the Russo-German pact of nonaggression in the hope of postponing Nazi attack on its territory. Nor did the Vatican have at its disposal the material power commanded by countries like Britain, Russia and the United States. Judged by secular standards, then, the Vatican may be said to have shown no more, but certainly no less, courage and prevision than these three great powers, none of which are predominantly Catholic.

On the spiritual plane, however, it could be argued that the Vatican, because of its opposition to the anti-religious character of the Soviet government, tended to favor individuals and movements that claimed to be fighting communism. In the process it did not give sufficient weight to the fact that much of the unrest throughout the world that was labeled communism actually resulted from deep-seated maladjustments which several Popes of modern times have repeatedly recognized, urging secular society to correct them through timely reforms. Yet when such reforms did not take place—as for example in Spain—and frustrated people sought to achieve long-overdue changes by revolution, the Vatican cast its political influence on the side of those who claimed to be fighting not only revolution, but also anti-clericalism. This trend has laid the Vatican open to criticism from quarters other than Moscow. And that is why many people who are deeply religious, and have nothing but the most profound respect for the high moral courage displayed by members of the Catholic hierarchy in Europe, most recently in the precincts of the Vatican itself, hope that at this critical hour the Vatican will incontrovertibly place itself on the side of the suffering and disinherited millions who see nothing incompatible between religious belief and social change.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## PATTERN FOR FRENCH EMPIRE

French Parliament; (2) the creation of a Colonial Assembly, to be located in France, which would act in an advisory capacity on colonial questions to the Ministry and Parliament; and (3) the creation of a Federal Chamber composed of representatives both from France and the colonies. These resolutions must await final sanction in France once the metropolitan area is reconquered and the French Committee of Liberation has been succeeded by properly constituted authority.

Any one of these proposals would indicate broader interest in colonial matters than existed in pre-war France. The consultative assembly is not unknown in French colonial experience, but the proposal indicating a "federation" of colonial areas represents a new departure. If such a colonial policy is developed, it must be viewed in relation to the reforms and influence of Felix Eboué, at present

Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa. It was no coincidence that the Colonial Conference was held in Brazzaville, where Eboué is stationed. It was in the Chad province of French Equatorial Africa that the Free French forces first gained support, for Eboué, then Governor, proclaimed that province in union with the de Gaulle forces shortly after the armistice of 1940 in France. In September 1940 General de Gaulle appointed Eboué Governor-General of a united French Equatorial Africa. Under his administration, the long-neglected colony has experienced a reformation that foreshadows future French policy.

**EBOUE—FRENCH ADMINISTRATOR.** Eboué, a native of French Guiana, has long served in the French Colonial Service. After early training in Bordeaux he was graduated from the School of Colonial Science in Paris. Since 1911—except for two interludes during which he acted as Secretary-General of Martinique and as Governor of Guadeloupe—Eboué has spent the greater part of his life in French Equatorial Africa. His long service and indefatigable work have made him one of the outstanding French colonial administrators and a trusted representative of the Africans. He has an intimate knowledge of native cultures, and through his efforts the production of cotton, rubber and diamonds has been increased—materially contributing to raising the standard of living in the colony. Following his appointment as Governor-General, the resources and manpower of the colony have been harnessed to the cause of the Allies. Public works were quickly undertaken for this purpose. Pointe-Noire, the Atlantic port, was greatly enlarged and improved. Two trans-African roads were constructed and various airports completed, notably at Fort Lamy and Brazzaville. During the period when the Axis threat hung heavily over North Africa, the colony, due to its strategic position, provided welcome bases on the route to the Middle East.

Primarily, however, Eboué's life interest has been

in the problems of native society, and it is here that his reforms will have their most telling effect. While it may be said that Eboué considers himself the representative of the French national idea and does not necessarily reflect the native's position in any conflict of interests, it has been his consistent policy to conserve political institutions as a means of preserving their cultural and moral traditions. This is a departure from the "assimilation" theories that were the essence of previous French colonial policies. It does not imply a divergence, however, from those policies which so largely freed French colonial life from the effects of the color barrier. It involves, rather, full recognition of the problems inherent in raising the living standards within dependent areas. Eboué does not propose political independence, but a progressive development of native participation in local self-administration. In his words: "The native must be considered as a human being . . . capable of progress in the framework of his natural institutions, and probably lost if he is detached from this background. We must preserve his institutions, and develop his sense of dignity and responsibility."

The recent proposals of the Brazzaville conference must be viewed in the light of Eboué's opinions regarding colonial rule. Federation, new to French colonial thinking, would demand many innovations before it could become fully practicable, and such federation could be effected only after a period during which the various French colonies had been administered according to the gradual system elaborated by Eboué in French Equatorial Africa.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

*The Road Back to Paris*, by A. J. Liebling. New York, Doubleday, 1944. \$3.00

Keenly perceptive and thoughtful report on the people of Paris, London, New York and Oran during the period of the Allies' struggle to gain the initiative against the Nazis.

*Clemenceau*, by Geoffrey Bruun. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1943. \$3.00

Scholarly and pertinent appraisal of the French leader in the light of recent events. It is the best biography of Clemenceau in English.

*War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, edited by Louise W. Holborn. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1943. \$2.50

Large and useful collection of statements on war and peace aims by representatives of all the United Nations from the outbreak of war to January 1943. Designed to indicate the growth of unity among the Allies.

For a 25-year survey of the foreign policy of the Vatican, as well as a record of its relations with Italy, Spain, Germany and the U.S.S.R., READ—

#### FOREIGN POLICY OF THE VATICAN

by Sherman S. Hayden


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January 15 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS  
REPORTS are published on the 1st and 15th of each month.  
Subscription \$5; to F.P.A. members, \$3.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIII, No. 18, FEBRUARY 18, 1944. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, President; DOROTHY F. LEET, Secretary; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year  
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

# Washington News Letter



FEB. 14.—Ever since the automobile displaced the horse and buggy, the United States economy in war and peace has depended on petroleum. The most optimistic reports now forecast that petroleum reserves in this country will last 30 years; the most pessimistic predict 14 years. The resulting desirability of augmenting American production from abroad prompted the announcement on February 5 by Harold L. Ickes, president of the Petroleum Reserves Corp., that the United States government plans to construct a 1,250-mile pipeline to carry oil from the rich fields of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, near the Persian Gulf, to the eastern Mediterranean shore. This project will cost between \$130,000,000 and \$165,000,000, and will be financed by the government in the form of a 25-year loan to the Arabian American Oil Co. (owned by Standard Oil of California and the Texas Oil Co.), which controls the Saudi Arabian field, and the Gulf Exploration Co. (owned by Gulf Oil Corp.), which controls the Kuwait field. The United States chiefs of staff and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board view the pipeline as a valuable source of supply, and the companies have agreed to maintain for 50 years a reserve of 1,000,000,000 barrels for the military services.

**OIL AN INTERNATIONAL QUESTION.** The need for Arabian oil stresses the international character of this country's economic position. The American government's proposal to finance construction of the pipeline is in itself an international undertaking fraught with great consequences, and implies a commitment on our part to protect the line if it is built. Maintenance of the pipeline would require a relationship of complete trust between the United States and Britain, in order that the two nations through joint action may contribute after the war to the continuance of peace in the Near East.

The proposed pipeline would traverse the British mandated territory of Transjordan, and terminate in Egypt, where Britain enjoys special treaty rights, or possibly in Palestine. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden told the House of Commons on February 9 that he had requested information on the American plan from the British Embassy in Washington. Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., announced on February 11 that talks on Near Eastern oil had been scheduled between the United States and Britain. Nor did he rule out the possibility that Russia might be included.

The war has placed a heavy drain on American petroleum reserves. The United States produced 67

per cent of world output in 1943, when consumption from this country's fields amounted to 4,565,000 barrels a day. Estimates of reserves here range from 20,000,000,000 barrels, by vice president Wallace Pratt of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, to 50,000,000,000, by Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War Ralph K. Davies. Synthetic oil can be made from coal; of which American reserves may last 3,000 years. But the cost of this process is great.

Estimated reserves abroad include 7,000,000,000 barrels in the Caribbean area (Trinidad, Venezuela and Colombia); 1,000,000,000 in the Netherlands East Indies; 25,000,000,000 in the Persian Gulf area (Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Bahrein Islands); and unknown quantities in Russia. Oil for the Allies was produced last year in these areas and, in lesser quantities, in Mexico, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil and India; and for the Axis in Rumania, Poland, Sakhalin Island and Formosa. Japan's chief source is the Indies, which last year produced an estimated 18,000,000 barrels. Germany's chief source is Rumania, which before the war accounted for two percent of world production but is believed to have declined since then.

American oil companies own holdings in Venezuela, Colombia, Trinidad, Iraq, Bahrein Island, Iran, British India, the Netherlands Indies and China, as well as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and are developing a considerable portion of the world petroleum resources that exist outside the United States and Russia. Until the present arrangement for a pipeline, the official United States policy was simply to insist on "open door" privileges for American companies in all regions where other outside companies operate. This policy won admission of American companies into Iraq over initial British opposition.

**AND A DOMESTIC QUESTION.** On February 6 Republican Senator Edward H. Moore of Oklahoma, an oil man, challenged the pipeline arrangement on the ground that it would lead to international complications that would be the "breeding places of future wars." Senator Moore is a member of a subcommittee of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee which opened hearings on February 15 on a resolution providing for the abolition of the Petroleum Reserves Corp. Construction of the pipeline awaits negotiation with the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, arrangements for a right of way, and decision about the point of outlet where, it is expected, a refinery will be built.

BLAIR BOLLES

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